The definitions of information and meaning two possible boundaries between physics and biology.
The standard approach to the definition of the physical quantities has not produced satisfactory results with the concepts of information and meaning. In the case of information we have at least two unrelated definitions, while in the case of meaning we have no definition at all. Here it is shown that both information and meaning can be defined by operative procedures, but it is also pointed out that we need to recognize them as a new type of natural entities. They are not quantities (neither fundamental nor derived) because they cannot be measured, and they are not qualities because are not subjective features. Here it is proposed to call them nominable entities, i.e., entities which can be specified only by naming their components in their natural order. If the genetic code is not a linguistic metaphor but a reality, we must conclude that information and meaning are real natural entities, and now we must also conclude that they are not equivalent to the quantities and qualities of our present theoretical framework. This gives us two options. One is to extend the definition of physics and say that the list of its fundamental entities must include information and meaning. The other is to say that physics is the science of quantities only, and in this case information and meaning become the exclusive province of biology. The boundary between physics and biology, in short, is a matter of convention, but the existence of information and meaning is not. We can decide to study them in the framework of an extended physics or in a purely biological framework, but we cannot avoid studying them for what they are, i.e., as fundamental components of the fabric of Nature.